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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 10-2170 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
SHALEN THOMAS, 
a/k/a Dontae Thomas,  
a/k/a Dontae Baskins 
 
SHALEN THOMAS, 
    Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 08-cr-00435) 
District Judge:  Honorable Alan N. Bloch 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 23, 2011 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
and POLLAK 
*
 District Judge. 
 
(Filed: June 23, 2011) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
                                                 
 *The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge for the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Shalen Thomas appeals his judgment of sentence following a guilty plea.  He asks 
us to revisit whether a prior conviction under Pennsylvania‘s misdemeanor resisting arrest 
statute, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5104, qualifies as a ―crime of violence‖ under the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), in light the Supreme Court‘s holding in 
Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010).  Because we find that Johnson does not 
change our previous holding that resisting arrest in Pennsylvania is a crime of violence, 
United States v. Stinson, 592 F.3d 460, 466 (3d Cir. 2010), and because the sentence 
imposed was procedurally and substantively reasonable, we will affirm. 
I 
We write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, so we review only 
briefly the essential facts and procedural history. 
In July 2009, Thomas pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  At sentencing, the District Court set his base 
offense level at 24 because Thomas had committed the unlawful firearm possession 
offense ―subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions of either a crime of 
violence or a controlled substance offense.‖  USSG § 2K2.1(a)(2).  Before pleading guilty 
in this case, Thomas had been convicted in state court of possession and possession with 
intent to deliver heroin and cocaine, a controlled substance offense.  He had also been 
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convicted in state court of resisting arrest, which the District Court found to be a crime of 
violence.  Although Thomas acknowledged the controlled substance offense, he argued 
that because resisting arrest was not a crime of violence, his base offense level should 
have been 20 under USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).  The District Court rejected Thomas‘s 
argument and, after further adjustments not relevant on appeal, calculated his final 
offense level as 23 and his criminal history category as V, resulting in a Guidelines range 
of 84-105 months imprisonment.  Had Thomas prevailed in his objection, his final 
offense level would have been 19, resulting in a Guidelines range of 57-71 months.  After 
considering Thomas‘s motions for departures and variances, which it denied, the District 
Court sentenced Thomas to 105 months imprisonment and three years of supervised 
release. 
II 
Thomas now appeals the District Court‘s denial of his objection to the calculation 
of his base offense level, as well as the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his 
sentence. 
We review sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion, looking first for 
procedural error and then examining the sentence for substantive reasonableness.  United 
States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2008).  We review a district court‘s legal 
interpretation of the Guidelines de novo.  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 561-68 
(3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).  ―If [an] asserted procedural error is purely factual, our review is 
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highly deferential and we will conclude there has been an abuse of discretion only if the 
district court‘s findings are clearly erroneous.‖  Wise, 515 F.3d at 217.  In evaluating a 
challenge to the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we must affirm ―unless no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular 
defendant for the reasons the district court provided.‖  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 
558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
A 
Pennsylvania‘s resisting arrest statute can be violated in the following two ways: 
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, with the intent of 
preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any 
other duty, the person [1] creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the 
public servant or anyone else, or [2] employs means justifying or requiring 
substantial force to overcome the resistance. 
18 Pa. C.S. § 5104. 
Under the Guidelines, a base offense level of 24 should be applied when 
sentencing a defendant for an unlawful firearms possession offense ―if the defendant 
committed any part of the offense subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions 
of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.‖  USSG § 2K2.1(a)(2).  
―Crime of violence‖ is defined as 
. . . any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year, that – 
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person of another, or 
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of 
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explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another. 
This definition is substantially similar to the definition of ―violent felony‖ under the 
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), and ―authority interpreting one is generally applied 
to the other.‖  United States v. Hopkins, 577 F.3d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 2009). 
In United States v. Stinson, we held that a conviction for resisting arrest under 
Pa.C.S. § 5104 qualified as a crime of violence.  592 F.3d at 464-66.  Stinson held that 
both means of violating the statute—―[1] creat[ing] a substantial risk of bodily injury to 
the public servant or anyone else, or [2] employ[ing] means justifying or requiring 
substantial force to overcome the resistance‖—fit within the second clause of the 
definition, known as the ―residual clause,‖ because the statute did not cover passive 
resistance and criminalized only ―purposeful, violent, and aggressive‖ acts that presented 
a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.  Id. (quoting United States v. Begay, 
553 U.S. 137, 144 (2008)). 
Shortly after Thomas was sentenced, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Johnson v. United States, which held that a conviction for simple battery in Florida was 
not a violent felony for purposes of ACCA because the phrase ―physical force‖ in the first 
clause of ACCA‘s definition means ―violent force—that is force capable of causing 
physical pain or injury to another person.‖  Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 
1271 (2010) (emphasis in original).  Thomas argues that a conviction for resisting arrest 
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in Pennsylvania no longer qualifies as a crime of violence, because § 5104 also does not 
require that the defendant have used violent force. 
Thomas‘s argument fails because our holding in Stinson was not that a conviction 
under § 5104 fulfilled the first clause of the definition of ―crime of violence,‖ but rather 
that it fulfilled the residual clause, in which the phrase ―physical force‖ does not appear.  
Johnson held only that the Florida battery statute in question did not describe a violent 
felony under ACCA‘s first clause, because the Government had disclaimed any reliance 
on the residual clause in that case.  Id. at 1274.  Nor can we assume, as Thomas urges, 
that because the Guidelines‘ definition is directed at classifying crimes of violence, it 
must include violent force as an element; the presence of the phrase ―physical force‖ in 
the first clause and its absence in the residual clause are significant.  See Leocal v. 
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10 n.7 (2004) (explaining that physical force is required to fulfill the 
residual clause of a different definition of crime of violence—18 U.S.C. § 16(b), which 
encompasses conduct ―that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force 
against the person or property of another may be used‖—and distinguishing it from the 
Guidelines‘ residual clause which does not mention physical force) (emphasis added). 
For these reasons, the District Court did not err in finding that Thomas‘s previous 
conviction for resisting arrest qualified as a crime of violence under the Guidelines, or in 
calculating his base offense level accordingly. 
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B 
 Thomas also argues that his sentence was procedurally and substantively 
unreasonable.  We disagree. 
The only procedural defect Thomas alleges is that the District Court failed to 
address his request for a downward variance to avoid an unwarranted sentencing 
disparity.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).  Specifically, he argues that similar convictions for 
resisting arrest in other states would likely not have counted as crimes of violence, 
resulting in a different base offense level and sentence for a defendant with a similar 
criminal history in a different state.  First, we note that various states classify, define, and 
punish resisting arrest differently, Pennsylvania is not alone in doing so in a way that 
qualifies it as a crime of violence.  See United States v. Jenkins, 631 F.3d 680, 684-85 
(4th Cir. 2011) (holding that resisting arrest in Maryland is a crime of violence under the 
Guidelines‘ residual clause); United States v. Almenas, 553 F.3d 27, 32-35 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(holding same in Massachusetts); United States v. Hudson, 577 F.3d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 
2009) (holding same for resisting arrest by fleeing in a dangerous manner in Missouri); 
see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:29-2 (defining resisting arrest in New Jersey in terms that 
closely track USSG § 4B1.2(a)).  Second, while the District Court did not explicitly state 
that it was addressing Thomas‘s motion for a variance on the basis of 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)(6), it did address his general request for a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  
Furthermore, the Court adequately explained—in both the written tentative findings 
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adopted at sentencing, and orally at sentencing—why Thomas‘s resisting arrest 
conviction counted as a crime of violence and why his specific history made it 
particularly appropriate, so it cannot be said that the District Court did not consider 
whether any disparity was unwarranted. 
Likewise, to the extent that Thomas‘s argument that his sentence was substantively 
unreasonable relies on the supposedly unwarranted disparity, it also fails.  Nor can we 
find that the sentence as a whole was substantively unreasonable, considering the totality 
of the § 3553(a) factors as viewed by the District Court.  See Grier, 475 F.3d at 571 (―The 
touchstone of ‗reasonableness‘ is whether the record as a whole reflects rational and 
meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).‖)  As the 
District Court found, a sentence at the top of the Guidelines range was warranted given 
the nature and circumstances of the offense and Thomas‘s criminal history.  The District 
Court reasonably understood the offense of conviction as a recent chapter in an escalating 
criminal history that already included convictions for illegally possessing firearms, 
possessing controlled substances, and aggravated assault. 
Accordingly, the District Court did not err procedurally or substantively in 
imposing Thomas‘s sentence. 
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‘s judgment of 
sentence. 
